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INTRODUCTION
In recent years the trend in policymaking in the U.S. and in the world at large has
been toward market-based tools. Lately, in many cases, this involves recommending
the use of “vouchers,” especially in education and housing. Further, beginning in the
late 1960s the federal government implemented several wage subsidy programs, in-
cluding JOBS (Job Opportunities in the Business Sector), WIN (Work Incentive), and
TJTC (Targeted Jobs Tax Credit), to improve employment opportunities for targeted
groups [Bartik, 2001; Burtless, 1985]. This study examines the possibility of using a
similar voucher as a supplement to the existing anti-discrimination policies in the job
market.
Affirmative action and laws prohibiting discriminatory acts have a common prob-
lem. With a view to promoting equity, they both involve the state ordering people to
do things they do not wish to do, or forbidding them to do things they wish to do. From
a classical liberal perspective, these are infringements on individual freedom. Fur-
ther, it is usually relatively costly to force people to do things they consider contrary
to their interests or preferences. The advantage of well-designed market based tools,
including vouchers, is that they induce people to prefer the actions that are the goals
of a policy. Supplementing the current anti-discrimination policies with market-based
vouchers may therefore improve overall efficiency without reducing (and perhaps in-
creasing) the level of equity already achieved.
Current anti-discrimination laws and policies came out of non-market oriented
social-democratic ideas that dominated intellectual and political circles from the 1940s332 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
through the 1960s. These policies are motivated by equity considerations only, though
equity and efficiency are both necessary for attaining optimum social welfare. Intro-
ducing new market-based policies, such as vouchers, while continuing with existing
programs may therefore offer an improved solution to the problem of discrimination
in the labor market. This paper extends the logic of market-based policy and examines
how, whether, and to what extent vouchers could supplement existing policies in
fighting against labor market discrimination.
While the issue of political feasibility is no more part of this paper than it was of
Friedman’s negative income tax proposal [Friedman, 1962], a discussion of relative
costs, cost distribution, and transparency of costs, is included in a later section. This
discussion would allow readers to draw conclusions with respect to the feasibility of
implementing the proposed voucher. In the first section below, we examine the na-
ture and degree of success of the current programs. In the next section, we present a
simple voucher system designed to accomplish the same ends as the present pro-
grams. An empirical model to illustrate the estimability of a static one-time voucher is
presented in the following section. In the section after that, we discuss the issue of
financing such a voucher and the impact of different financing methods on the distri-
bution of costs and benefits. Then there is a section which discusses more complex
voucher systems that would be needed in any practical application. The final section
summarizes the overall message of this paper.
CURRENT PROGRAMS
Anti-discrimination laws and programs have changed over the decades since the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, but some generalizations can be made. First, general anti-
discrimination laws make it illegal to treat members of protected groups unequally
with respect to wages, hiring, and conditions of employment. This legal obligation
applies (with some exceptions, such as religious organizations and very small firms) to
all employers.
Affirmative action mostly involves government-related employment.1 Government
agencies, recipients of federal funding, and most companies doing business with the
government are obliged to do more than passively await applications from members of
protected groups. They are obliged to encourage applications and take positive actions
to attain labor forces more closely resembling the population’s proportions. Private
employers with a (pre-1964) history of discrimination may approach “quotas” voluntar-
ily; others (e.g., AT&T) may be directed to do so by court order.
Both general obligations under the 1964 Civil Rights Act (as amended) and affir-
mative action deal with two different but related matters. One is equal work. The
other is equal pay for equal work. In some parts of the economy, particularly govern-
ment employment, significant gains have been made in both respects. The gains have
involved costs, some administrative and some in efficiency.2 However, under current
policies there may be a trade-off between wage and employment equalization. Current
programs designed to achieve equal wages may raise the unemployment rate for blacks
since equality of wages implies prejudiced employers only hire black members with
productivity above that of marginal white hires.333 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
Efficiency costs for current programs depend on whether workers hired due to
anti-discrimination policies are equal in productivity to those who would have been
hired without these policies. If they have lower productivity, efficiency costs could be
high. If they are superior, but would not have been hired [because of an incorrect
perception of lower productivity or a taste for discrimination] there would be net
social benefits from greater efficiency.3
Programs requiring non-discriminatory hiring have enforcement problems. For
example, it is difficult to tell whether hiring is non-discriminatory, so strict enforce-
ment virtually requires a “quota” system, which is intrinsically inefficient. In addition
to direct enforcement costs, inefficiency is implied since quotas force employers who
may not want to discriminate to make hiring choices based on non-efficiency consider-
ations.
In judging the success of current programs major considerations are: (a) how
much convergence in wages and occupational distributions has there been; (b) how
much of the convergence is due to government policies; and (c) how much conver-
gence (or divergence) in unemployment rates has there been, and why. With respect
to (a), convergence since 1964 has been real, though incomplete. With respect to (b),
there is disagreement. Some of the literature ascribes much of the convergence in
wages to supply side changes. That is, improvements in the social safety net and
improvements in educational opportunities for blacks reduced the supply of unskilled
black labor, raising its price relative to the white wage.4 The portion of the wage
convergence ascribed to anti-discrimination policies ranges from near zero for affir-
mative action [Smith and Welch, 1989; Butler and Heckman, 1977; Heckman and
Wolpin, 1976; Heckman and Payner, 1989], to high for anti-bias policies in general.5
With respect to (c), after allowing for the effects of the recent long cyclical peak, since
1964 black unemployment rates have tended to rise, relative to white unemployment
rates [Mohanty, 2000].6
The evidence on the success of existing programs is mixed. It is not clear what
their costs have been, partly because much of the cost is administrative costs for firms
and organizations. It does not seem that the current system is optimal or nearly so,
and a voucher supplement to that system could reduce inefficiencies while improving
the overall impact on those subject to discrimination.
AN OPTIMAL VOUCHER
Following Becker and Arrow, we assume a taste for discrimination by employers,7
with white employees preferred over blacks. With discrimination, there are separate
demand functions for blacks and whites. Since some employers prefer not to hire
blacks, demand for blacks is less and their equilibrium market wage is lower than that
for whites. We assume the goal of anti-discrimination policy is elimination of income
inequality, and income equality in this context refers to achieving equal wages and
equal probability of employment for blacks (given equivalent qualifications).
A voucher (V) would represent a right to a payment for hiring a person and would
be distributed to blacks.8 If a firm hires blacks it pays a net wage of Wb-V. To hire
whites, it pays wage Ww. If the V is set correctly, its value compensates enough em-334 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ployers for the psychic cost of hiring a less preferred person, or one presumed less
productive despite equal qualifications. (Or it may compensate employers for the costs
of integration noted by Arrow [1985].) As a result, including the voucher amount,
equilibrium values of Ww and Wb are equal. An optimal voucher equalizes the marginal
desirability of hiring from the two groups and equalizes unemployment rates, ad-
justed for qualifications, while equalizing wages.
To make this point clear, suppose the probability of a white being hired is Pw(E),
and the probability of an equally qualified black getting hired (with an equal wage) is
Pb(E) and, in the absence of vouchers, Pw(E)>Pb(E). The probabilities depend on the
relative costs (including psychic costs) of hiring the two.9 An optimal voucher V* is the
value for which, when market wages as received by workers are equalized at Ww = Wb
= W*, the following equality holds:
Pw(Ww ) = Pw(W*) = Pb(W*-V*) = Pb(Wb ).
This is optimal since individuals with equal qualifications are equally likely to be
employed, with equal earnings, and the effects of discrimination on hiring and wage
rates are eliminated. This outcome meets standard efficiency conditions and elimi-
nates job discrimination.
The value of vouchers issued does not measure the social cost of the program. The
social cost of the program is the administrative cost (government and private) plus net
efficiency cost.10 If these costs are sufficiently large they could exceed the social gain
from increased efficiency, but this is true for all anti-discrimination programs. Income
redistribution due to the voucher depends on how taxes are levied to pay for them—
voucher amount plus government administrative cost. Leaving the tax issue to the
section on financing the voucher system, we consider other redistributive effects of
the voucher.
If the voucher is set at the optimum there will be income redistribution among
employers. The most discriminatory employers would refuse to hire blacks at V*, and
receive only the psychic income of not hiring blacks (absent more stringent enforce-
ment of existing policies). Employers with infra-marginal (or no) taste for discrimina-
tion receive net benefits. The less the preference for discrimination, the greater the
net benefit.11 Equally, of course, this would also imply that some firms would be very
eager to get the vouchers, and would hire only blacks. Some would find the vouchers
insufficient to motivate them to hire any blacks. Workplace segregation could rise as
a result.12
Obviously, recipients of vouchers gain from the program, with higher average
incomes and more employment. Whether other workers gain or lose (displacement
effects) depends on a good many things, including those discussed in the section on the
empirical illustration of the proposed system. If jobs are homogeneous, there is only
one V* to determine, if they are heterogeneous, a set of values is required (see the
section on financing the voucher system).13
The discussion above assumes a one shot voucher (one per person, per employer),
with the amount paid (at the end of a year, or over a year) for a period of employ-335 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
ment.14 As noted above, there have been a number of wage subsidy programs which
could be considered structurally equivalent to voucher programs. We choose to con-
centrate on one to illustrate the potential effectiveness of such a program. In 1984-85
the Illinois Unemployment Insurance experiment looked into means to reduce the
duration of unemployment in sample groups.15 One version, which used a payment
that amounted to a voucher, caused a significant difference in the duration of unem-
ployment for beneficiaries.
Bartik [2001] provides substantial discussion of a large number of such programs,
including a discussion of the program featured in Burtless’ [1985] article. Bartik makes
it clear that possible effects can vary considerably depending on both the exact provi-
sions of a program and on its scope. Most such programs have been small relative
even to regional labor markets, and all have been small relative to national markets.
As a result, a program of the type discussed in this paper cannot be fully judged based
on his work, suggestive as it is in some respects. (See also Katz [1998] for a positive
empirical evaluation of some small-scale programs, despite stigma effects.)
In particular, the type of voucher program discussed in this paper would differ in
many respects from all prior wage subsidy programs with respect to breadth, objec-
tives, targeted persons, and potential costs and benefits.16 Some of these differences
are closely related, but the breadth issue is most obviously important, since a voucher
targeted to those of African American heritage would involve over ten percent of the
population and of the national labor market, and a majority of the population in some
major local markets. No previous program came anywhere close to such coverage,
and potential costs and benefits to so large a program may differ in kind as well as in
degree from smaller programs (macroeconomic considerations would become relevant).
The objectives of prior programs involved mostly aiding persons in relatively unskilled
portions of the labor market who, either due to their own past history or to local labor
market conditions, were likely to be considered poor job candidates. This proposed
program would not just involve low wage or unskilled jobs, and is not dependent for
eligibility on personal histories or local conditions. (This is relevant to the discussion
of “stigma effects” later.) In fact, unlike the earlier studies, this program would target
not only unemployed blacks, but also employed blacks.17
The analysis above does not indicate the redistributive effects between black and
white workers. To address this issue, we start with a deterministic model, in which
the equilibrium is defined as a zero unemployment rate. Define the following vari-
ables: St = total labor supply; Dt = total labor demand; Sw = supply of white workers;
Dw = demand for white workers; W = white population; Sb = supply of black workers;
Db = demand for black workers; B = black population; Ww = wage for white workers; Wb
= wage for black workers; d = discrimination variable, to be defined later. Equilibrium
in the market for White workers requires
(1) Sw = Sw(Ww, W) = Dw(Ww) =Dw.
Equilibrium in the market for Black workers requires336 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(2) Sb = Sb(Wb, B) = Db(Wb, d) =Db.
Equilibrium in the overall labor market requires
(3) St = Sw + Sb = Dw + Db = Dt.
If black and white labor supply preferences and demographics are identical, at a given
(equal) wage the proportion of the white and black forces in the labor supply are
identical to their proportions in the population. We define Sb(Wb, B) = sb(Wb)*B and
Sw(Ww, W) = sw(Ww)*W, where sw and sb are proportions of the given population in the
labor force. For any given wage, sw = sb.
Assuming that employers prefer white workers to black ones, we define the dis-
crimination variable d as the proportion of the white wage at which the black wage
makes a black worker as acceptable for hiring as a white worker. The demand for
black workers is
(4) Db = Db(d*Ww) with d< 1.
In the absence of any rules about discrimination, at full equilibrium the markets find
a wage Ww for which
(5) St = Dt; sw*W = Dw; sb*B = Db.
Equation (5) consists of two conditions, not three, since the first is satisfied if the
others are. If d were an exogenous constant, such an equilibrium might not exist. For
a given d (given all other parameters of S and D functions) there could be a wage Ww
such that sw*W=Dw, but not sb*B=Db.
Suppose at the current Ww (with equilibrium in the white market) sb*B > Db, then
Wb should decline, but Wb = d*Ww. If Wb declines for given Ww, that implies a decline in
d. The value of d is an outcome which measures the wage ratio required, given dis-
criminatory views of employers for full employment in both markets (and in the com-
bined market) when there are no anti-discrimination rules.
Starting from the equilibrium above, we introduce a well-enforced rule: wages for
black and white workers must be equal, Wb = Ww (this is not a law but a rule for which
strict enforcement means strict determination of the proper voucher). Assume no
change in Ww (and neither supply nor demand are perfectly inelastic), the rise in Wb
means: Sb(Ww) > Sb(d*Ww) and Db(Ww)<Db(d*Ww). Since initially sb(d*Ww) *B = Db(d*Ww),
now Sb(Ww)*B > Db(Ww). Unemployment results due to the equalization of wages in the
presence of discriminating employers. In the model, whites have zero unemployment,
and blacks have a positive unemployment rate. The real world equivalent is a higher
measured unemployment rate for blacks than for whites.
An optimal voucher restores equality of unemployment rates, that is the voucher
ensures that Db = sb*B when Dw = sw*W, even though the wage rate received by black
workers equals the wage received by white workers. If WbR is the wage received by
black workers, and WbP is the (net) wage paid by employers to black workers, a voucher337 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
means that: WbR = WbP + V, where V is the amount of the voucher. The voucher is a
wedge between amounts received by workers and amounts paid by employers. If wages
received by workers are equalized, WbR= Ww= WbP + V. If WbP = d*Ww, as was true
before the introduction of an equal pay rule, WbR=Ww=d*Ww + V. Solving this equation
for the voucher, we have
(6) V = (1 - d)*Ww.
Assume the white wage is at the original (no rule, no voucher) level, so sw*W = Dw.
If the supply of labor from blacks is completely inelastic, Sb is constant. In that case,
with Ww at the original value the total supply of labor, as well as the supply of black
labor, is unchanged, Db(WbP) = Db(d*Ww) = Sb(WbR), and the voucher has equalized
unemployment rates at zero. In this case the whole amount of the voucher shows up
as a higher wage for black workers. If the issue of financing of vouchers is ignored
there is no effect (compared to no rule, no voucher) on output, white wages or employ-
ment, black employment, or employers.
Perfect inelasticity of black labor supply is improbable. Assume black labor supply
is positively related to WbR. At the original white wage, introduction of the voucher
increases black labor supply with no change in the demand for black labor. In the
market for black labor and in the combined market there is an excess supply of labor.
The initial effect should be a decline in black wages (both WbR and WbP). If there is
initially a constant value for d, black labor is now a cheaper substitute for white labor.
This implies a downward shift in demand for white labor. The assumption that all
differences other than measurable characteristics are due to discrimination implies
the two are, absent discrimination, perfect substitutes. A lower black wage (WbP) means
Wb/Ww < d0 (where d0 is the original value of d). This lower value causes discrimina-
tory employers to switch to black workers, since the new proportion more than makes
up for their discriminatory preferences. The result of the downward shift in Dw is a
decline in the equilibrium value of Ww. The new joint equilibrium will have a different
value for d as well. A change in the value of d is the result of the process that caused
a decline in Ww so it is not possible to produce a new equilibrium with no change in Ww,
only a decline in d.
The effect on output of the (equal wage) voucher is indeterminate when black
labor supply is not perfectly inelastic. More black workers will be employed, given the
greater supply in equilibrium, but fewer white workers will be employed (displace-
ment) (given the decline in Dw and therefore in Ww). Employer costs are lower since
both black and white wages paid by employers are lower. Lower employer costs could
mean larger total production but such a conclusion has no firm foundation, absent a
general equilibrium analysis including the method of financing the voucher, and all
redistribution effects (from changes in wages versus profits, from changes in white
versus black income—if their spending preferences differ, and from the financing
scheme) on demand for final goods and services. (However, see Bartik [2001, 107] and
O’Neill [1982] for discussions of the possible positive net employment effects of broad
wage subsidies.)338 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPOSED VOUCHER
In order to show that, in principle, it is possible to estimate an optimal voucher we
present a simple model that outlines the estimation of a one-shot voucher. It is impor-
tant to note that the voucher estimate shown in this section has illustrative implica-
tions only. It should not therefore be confused with an actual voucher recommended
for the U.S. labor market. Estimation of actual vouchers for different groups would, in
a dynamic framework, require econometric modeling that is beyond the scope of this
paper. Such estimation is, therefore, left as a topic for future research.
Estimating Equations
An optimal voucher is the amount, which, if paid to the employer for hiring a
black worker, would completely eliminate the unexplained unemployment rate differ-
ential. Estimation of this differential requires modeling the unemployment rate (UR)
as a function of the worker’s wage (w). The unemployment rate is inversely related to
the individual employment probability P, which in turn depends on the wage the
worker would be paid if hired, so that:
(7) UR = 1- P(EMP)
A worker in the labor force is employed (EMPi=1) only if the employer’s preference
function for that worker (yi) is positive. Thus,
(8) EMPi = 1, if yi > 0, and = 0, otherwise.
The unobserved yi depends on worker characteristics (Xi) and the log wage rate (ln wi).
Thus,
(9) yX w u ii i i =+ + βγ ln .   
The employment probability of the ith worker, therefore, can be written as
(10) PE M P Pu X w ii i i () ( - - l n ) == > 1 βγ .
Estimation of equation (10) requires prior estimation of the wage equation, since
the wage rate is available only for employed workers. Defining Zi as the vector of
worker characteristics that influence wages, the semi-log wage equation for the ith
worker can be written as
(11) lnwZ v ii i =+ δ .
Assuming normal error terms in equations (9) and (11), the structural employment
probability in equation (10) can be estimated by a two-stage probit [Lee, 1979]. Stage 1339 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
estimates the reduced form employment probability equation and generates the ap-
propriate selectivity variable, which enters the wage equation as a regressor [Heckman,
1979]. The two-step estimate of ln wi = Ziδ, corrected for selectivity bias, enters the
structural employment probability equation as an explanatory variable. Equation (10)
then is estimated by a second stage probit. The estimated employment probability for
the ith worker is
(12) PE M P X Z ii i ( ) ( ( )). == + 1 Φ βγ δ
The employment probabilities following equation (12) are estimated for all workers in
the sample and are used in equation (7) to estimate the unemployment rate as follows:
(13) UR P EMP X Z ii i =− = =− + 11 1 ( ) ( ( )), Φ βγ δ
where Φ  denotes the average of workers’ employment probabilities.
Estimation of the voucher requires estimating either equation (12) or equation
(13) for blacks and whites separately, and then finding through a simulation the opti-
mum black wage (w*) that would eliminate the unexplained differential between black
and white unemployment rates (or employment probabilities). The difference between
the current black wage and w* provides a measure of the voucher.
The Data
A sample of 53,235 workers was drawn from the 2003 Current Population Survey
(CPS) annual demographic file. It includes only blacks and non-Hispanic white males:
42,746 white males, 4,645 black males, and 5,844 black females, all employed or seek-
ing employment. Those employed consist of 39,900 white males, 4,064 black males,
and 5,265 black females. White females are not included in the sample because esti-
mation of the voucher requires comparing blacks with white workers who are free
from employer’s discrimination in the labor market, and traditionally white males,
and not white females, are known to satisfy this condition. To compare the results
from the 2003 sample with those from another year, we drew another sample of 34,502
workers from the 2000 CPS annual demographic file. This year was chosen because it
exhibits the lowest civilian unemployment rate (4 percent) during the last decade. The
2000 sample consists of 28,648 white males, 2,603 black males, and 3,251 black fe-
males in the labor force: employed or seeking employment. The employed sample
includes of 27,378 white males, 2,397 black males, and 3,006 black females.
The variables that influence the employer’s hiring decision are: worker’s educa-
tion (HSDGRE, ASSCDGRE, BACHDGRE, MSTRDGRE, PROFDGRE, DCTRDGRE),
age (AGE, AGESQ), marital status (MARRIED), region of residence (NEAST, MWEST,
SOUTH), place of residence (CENTCITY, SMSBLNS), whether the worker is born in
the United States (USBORN), family income (FAMINC), and the predicted wage the
employer would pay if the worker is hired (PREDWAGE).340 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
All variables mentioned above except the family income are used in the wage
equation. Higher family income through better networking facilities may help a worker
get a job, but the employer would find it hard to pay this worker a wage higher than
wages of similar employees with identical characteristics. Consequently, this variable
is excluded from the wage equation. This exclusion allows identification of the wage
and employment equations. In addition to the variables just mentioned, the wage also
depends on the worker’s occupation (MANG, PROF, SERV, SALE, ADMN, OPRTV,
MOVE), industry affiliation (MANF, TRAD, TRNS, INFO, FINC, SRVC), government
employment status (GOVT), and fulltime status (FULLTIME). Thus, both employ-
ment and wage equations are identified. Note that the first stage reduced form probit
also includes all variables included in the wage equation. Since government employ-
ment status, occupation and industry variables are not available for unemployed work-
ers, they are collected from their response to longest occupation, industry and em-
ployment status. Thus the first stage probit and the wage equation are identified by
two variables: family income included only in the former and fulltime status included
in the later only. All these variables are defined in the appendix.
An Estimate of the Voucher
The Heckman-Lee two-step procedure is used to estimate wage equations in three
relevant demographic sub-samples (white males, black males, and black females). The
wage coefficients are used to obtain predicted log wages (PREDWAGE) for all work-
ers—employed and unemployed. This variable enters the structural hiring equation
as an explanatory variable. Coefficients from the structural equation (second stage
probit) are reported in Table 1. (First stage reduced from probit and wage estimates
may be obtained from the authors on request.) The coefficients in all three equations
assume expected signs and significance levels. Importantly, the sign and significance
of PREDWAGE in all three equations (except in the 2000 black samples) confirm that
with other characteristics held constant, the worker’s employment probability in most
cases declines as the wage rate rises. The positive sign of PREDWAGE in the black
female equation of the 2000 sample suggests that employers in some cases may con-
sider higher estimated wages as indicators of greater productivity, and thus may hire
those workers. Lack of significance of PREDWAGE in the 2000 black-male sample
results clearly from high degree of collinearity between PREDWAGE and other ex-
planatory variables.18 Despite this problem, we retain the current specification be-
cause the estimation of employment probabilities requires coefficients only and are
unaffected by the significance levels of the coefficients.
The two-stage probit coefficients are used to estimate employment probabilities
for all three demographic groups at their current wage rates. First, second and fourth
rows of Table 2 report the average hourly wages and the associated employment
probabilities. Clearly, the white males have the lowest unemployment rate (for ex-
ample, 6.7 percent in the 2003 sample), and the black males have the highest (12.5
percent in 2003). Although the unemployment rates are lower in the 2000 sample, the
ordering among the three groups remains the same. To measure the unexplained
unemployment rate differential between blacks and white males, we estimated the341 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
black employment probabilities when they are treated as white males (i.e., with white-
male coefficients). The third and fifth rows, and second and fifth columns of Table 2
report these probabilities. In the 2003 sample, the employment probabilities of black
males and females rise from .875 and .901 to .913 and .925, respectively. These differ-
entials do not result from measured characteristics, and therefore are unexplained.
As explained earlier, these unexplained unemployment rate differentials may arise
because black workers are paid wages higher than what the employers would be will-
ing to pay them, and consequently they can be eliminated by payment of a voucher.
The results in the 2000 sample, however, are quite different. Since PREDWAGE
is statistically insignificant in the black-male sample and has a positive coefficient in
the black-female sample, no voucher can be estimated for this year using the proce-
dure outlined in this study. This does not, of course, mean that there is no hiring
discrimination against blacks in the year 2000. It may reflect the fact that, during a
period in which cyclical unemployment is essentially zero, even those generally dis-
criminated against are hired. After all, those who would be preferred (white male
workers) are not available.
In order to obtain the wage that would completely eliminate the unexplained
employment probability differential (or unemployment rate differential) in the 2003
sample, we did simulations in both black samples. The predicted wages of all workers
were gradually lowered by small amounts, holding all other characteristics constant.
Successive iterations resulted in a rise in the average black employment probability,
reducing the unemployment rate gap. Iterations continued till the unexplained differ-
ential was reduced to zero. We found in the 2003 sample that a reduction of the
average black-male wage rate from $13.40 to $12.48 an hour and a cut in the average
black-female wage rate from $12.23 to $10.88 an hour would eliminate the unex-
plained unemployment rate differentials between blacks and white males. With these
lower wages, the employment probabilities of black males and black females would
rise to .913 and .925 respectively, completely eliminating the unexplained part of the
black-white unemployment rate differential. The extent of these wage cuts measures
the hourly voucher for an average black worker. In the 2003 sample, the average
hourly voucher for a black male is $0.92 and for a black female it is $1.35. In other
words, if the employer pays the average black male worker $13.40 an hour but is paid
a subsidy of $0.92 by the government for hiring the worker, the unexplained gap
between black and white unemployment rates can be eliminated without lowering the
already-low wages of black males. This, of course, would not eliminate the gap due to
differences in measured characteristics. The voucher is designed to eliminate only the
unexplained differential, assumed to be the result of discrimination.
Using estimates of the hourly vouchers reported in the above paragraph, we can
obtain an estimate of the total dollar amount that the federal government would
allocate for vouchers during a given year.19 In our example, the total voucher cost for
the year 1999 is zero.20 This is the lower bound of the total annual voucher outlay that
is likely to be incurred during a period of full employment. During a period of wide-
spread unemployment, however, the federal outlay on the proposed voucher schemes
is  expected to be positive. Using the results from our 2003 sample, we estimated342 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 1
Structural Employment Probability Equations for Different
Demographic Groups (Two-Stage Probit Estimates).a
Variables White-Male Black-Male Black-Female
A. 2003 Sample
Constant 8.5669** 10.166**  59.715**
(46.801) (19.326)   (7.042)
AGE  0.7723**   0.5195**   2.2732**
(59.067) (21.289)   (7.005)
AGESQ  -0.0079**  -0.0053**   -0.0229**
(57.071) (19.656)   (6.769)
CENTCITY  1.2684**   0.6312**   5.9407**
(24.930)  (5.476)   (6.460)
SMSBLNS 1.8412**   1.7616**   8.8250**
(38.827) (12.310)   (7.268)
NEAST  0.4757**   0.6197**   2.9629**
(9.097)  (5.028)   (4.868)
MWEST  -.2968**   0.0109   -0.7642
(6.084)  (0.100)   (1.300)
WEST  0.0303   0.3108**   0.3169
(0.624)  (2.142)   (0.504)
HSDGRE  0.3994**   0.1930**   -0.4404
(9.961)  (2.074)   (1.058)
ASSCDGRE  2.0850**   2.0507**   4.9086**
(27.058)  (10.346)   (5.457)
BACHDGRE  4.8238**   3.4078**   23.111**
(55.179)  (19.142)   (6.943)
MSTRDGRE  5.7238**   4.9094**   29.854**
(42.295)  (13.559)   (6.664)
PROFDGRE  10.095**   7.2228**   30.985
(30.838)  (8.157)   (0.544)
DCTRDGRE  8.2533**   6.9746**   40.757
(25.710)  (9.086)   (0.442)
MARRIED 2.5271**  1.5135**   2.2685**
(47.339)  (14.006)   (3.328)
USBORN  2.7786**   0.6182**   1.8140*
(43.332)  (4.449)   (1.760)
FAMINC  -0.0001   0.0001   0.0009
(1.195)  (0.860)   (0.325)
PREDWAGE  -10.438**  -8.4928**  -43.649**
(65.815)  (26.940)   (7.334)
Sample 42,746   4,645   5,844
the voucher outlay for the year 2002 to be $3,396,034,200.21 Note that the year 2002
belongs to a period of significant wide-spread unemployment, and moreover, our esti-
mated hourly vouchers, which use white male coefficients as the no-discrimination
coefficients, act as the upper bounds on actual vouchers to be implemented in the real
world. Consequently, the estimated voucher outlay just reported for the year 2002
may be considered as the upper bound for the total annual expenditure that the fed-
eral government would incur during a given year. In other words, the annual cost of
the voucher during a year with average level of unemployment would be much less
than 3,396 million dollars, the amount estimated for 2002.343 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
TABLE 1—Continued
Structural Employment Probability Equations for Different
Demographic Groups (Two-Stage Probit Estimates).a
Variables White-Male Black-Male Black-Female
B. 2000 Sample
Constant  8.5106** 22.105  -5.8575**
(26.244) (0.043) (10.918)
AGE   0.7962**  1.0881  -0.2832**
(33.715) (0.036) (10.664)
AGESQ  -0.0081** -0.0115  0.0033**
(32.570) (0.025) (10.187)
CENTCITY   1.6892**  2.0165  -0.8265**
(16.920) (0.014)  (5.606)
SMSBLNS   2.4186**  2.3360  -1.2212**
(24.317) (0.102)  (7.305)
NEAST   0.9509** -0.0424  -0.6126**
 (8.932) (0.001)  (4.356)
MWEST   0.2386** -0.3125  -0.5385**
 (2.470) (0.003)  (3.850)
WEST   0.0800  1.4540  -0.2509
 (0.911) (0.007)  (0.912)
HSDGRE   0.5959** -1.5776  -0.0953
 (7.706) (0.012)  (0.831)
ASSCDGRE   2.2301**  0.2510  -1.4710**
(12.536) (0.001)  (6.276)
BACHDGRE   5.0976**  4.7315  -2.7665**
(29.435) (0.028) (10.182)
MSTRDGRE   5.6818**  5.1599  -5.9841**
(23.426) (0.013) (13.880)
PROFDGRE   9.2851**  8.1582  -2.7963
(16.306) (0.008)  (0.051)
DCTRDGRE   9.9119**  3.2702  -3.9474
 (4.272) (0.003)  (0.053)
MARRIED   2.4525**  2.0002  -0.3205**
(24.864) (0.013)  (2.310)
USBORN   2.8578**  2.2447  -0.3547**
(22.365) (0.008)  (1.981)
FAMINC  -0.0001** -0.0001  0.0001
 (4.313) (0.002)  (0.824)
PREDWAGE  -10.836** -15.251  7.3246**
(37.433) (0.120) (19.579)
Sample 28,648  2,603  3,251
a The numbers in parentheses are absolute t-ratios.
** (*) Significant at 5 percent (10 percent) level.
It is important to note that despite being the upper bound, the annual voucher
cost for the year 2002 remains only .03 percent of the 2002 gross domestic product
(GDP) and .17 percent of the 2002 total federal outlay.22 In other words, the cost of the
proposed voucher plan is certainly not overwhelming even during a period of the
worst economic recession. In fact, when compared to other existing social programs
funded by the federal government, the cost of the proposed voucher plan is simply
negligible.23 This program therefore is financially viable, and it has the capability of344 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
achieving the desired goal of equity in employment without burdening the federal
treasury significantly. Moreover, to the extent the vouchers are paid off by the meth-
ods outlined in the next section, the burden of this proposed program on the federal
budget is quite small and so is not prohibitive.
TABLE 2
Average Wages and Employment Probabilities
Demographic 2003 Sample 2000 Sample
Group
Hourly P(EMP=1) Hourly Hourly P(EMP =1) Hourly
Wage ($) Voucher Wage ($) Voucher
($)  ($)
White Males 16.16 0.933 —.— 14.11  0.956 —.—
Black Males 13.40 0.875 0.92 13.34  0.921 0.00
Black Males 12.48* 0.913**  0.913**
Treated as White
Males in Employment
Black Females 12.23 0.901 1.35  9.77  0.924 0.00
Black Females 10.88* 0.925**  0.997**
Treated as White
Males in Employment
* The wage rate that would eliminate the unexplained part of the black-white employment probabil-
ity differential (w*).
** Employment probabilities of blacks when they are treated as whites in the hiring process (allowing
for the difference in observed characteristics).
The voucher estimated above has limitations. An accurate measurement of voucher
requires that all relevant explanatory variables are included in the hiring equation,
because a part of the unexplained differential may be attributed to unmeasured char-
acteristics [Blau and Beller, 1988]. Second, the size of the voucher may differ by occu-
pation and industry. If, in an occupation, the unexplained differential is zero or nega-
tive, no voucher is necessary in such an occupation. Third, the size of the voucher
may differ from year to year. During a period of prosperity (for instance, in the 2000
sample), the vouchers for black workers would be smaller and could even equal zero.
Fourth, the white male coefficient vector is not necessarily the best no-discrimi-
nation coefficient vector. In measuring wage discrimination, several authors have
suggested different no-discrimination coefficient vectors [Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994].
Fifth, the residual decomposition approach followed in this appendix may suffer from
the non-linearity inherent in the Probit model. Despite this limitation, previous au-
thors [Johnson 1983; Abowd and Killingsworth, 1984] have used this approach to esti-
mate the magnitude and impact of labor market discrimination. Using this approach
increases the comparability between this paper and past literature, and is harmless as
long as it is only used for illustrative purposes.
Finally, estimation of the unexplained differential from cross section data ignores
unobserved heterogeneity among workers, which may be resolved using appropriate345 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
panel data. Reliable estimation of vouchers for actual implementation would require a
great deal of additional work. The results discussed here simply show that it is pos-
sible to estimate voucher values for a program of this type. The estimates presented
in this section should not therefore be confused with actual voucher amounts recom-
mended for implementation in this country.
FINANCING A VOUCHER SYSTEM
Before considering financing, it is clear that most of the benefits of a voucher
program would go to those found eligible to receive a voucher. Employers who accept
vouchers gain financially. The less discriminatory their preferences, the more vouch-
ers they accept and the more they gain.24 In psychic terms, vouchers barely compen-
sate marginal employers for their loss of pleasure in discriminating. (Alternatively, it
compensates for the extra costs they face if preferences of other workers or customers
are the source of the behavior). Infra-marginal employers have net psychic gains plus
financial gains, while those who refuse to hire blacks, even with vouchers, neither
gain nor lose.25 Disregarding possible net employment effects, white workers face
greater job competition and lower wages, as in traditional programs.
When financing is considered, distribution effects depend on the alternative cho-
sen. For example, assume the direct costs of the voucher program were covered by a
tax on employers. Abstracting from administrative costs, the average employer would
receive as much in voucher money as had been paid in taxes so, on average, employ-
ers break even. Infra-marginal employers receive more voucher funds than average
and would be net financial gainers, while those who insist on discriminating receive
less than average (down to zero) funds, while paying taxes to support the program.
This means an increased incentive for non-discrimination over the whole range of
behavior, making the achievement of income equality more likely.
Assume the current burden of taxation to support those unemployed or underem-
ployed due to discrimination rests, in part, on white workers. To the extent this bur-
den is reduced, the impact on white workers depends on the net impact of lower wages
and lower tax burdens. The total effect is ambiguous, and it is possible that there will
be no negative net impact on white workers. If aggregate output and demand for labor
rise, this reduces the potential negative impact on white workers.
Alternatively, assume the vouchers are financed by a general income tax. Taxes
on workers who get vouchers pay for some of the program. If W is the wage for both
groups after equalization, then W-Wb is the gain for blacks when neither financing nor
the probability of employment are considered. If these elements are included in the
analysis, and TV is the added tax rate on income due to the vouchers,26 their net gains are
(14) (Pb(V))W*(1 - TV) - (Pb(NV))Wb ,
Pb(V) is the probability of employment for blacks with a voucher, Pb(NV) is the prob-
ability with no voucher. If administrative costs approach zero, this is guaranteed to be
positive. It would reach zero if, and only if, all voucher funds were paid by this group
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Ignoring reductions in the burden of other social programs (and assuming no
change in the probability of employment for whites), white workers would have a
change in income of
(15) W*(1 - TV) - Ww < 0.
Under the given assumptions, this is negative, since W*< Ww and (1 - TV) < 1. For this
to be positive, the impact of the voucher on tax burdens has to be negative—savings
on social programs have to be large compared to voucher outlays. In that case, TV is
negative (Ww measured net of taxes), and net effects positive if,
(16) TV > 1 - Ww/W*.
The impact on employers is naturally more favorable than if all financing were
through a tax on them. Marginal employer participants get financial returns of
(17) [Π(V*) + nV*](1 - TV),
where Π(V*) is the operating profit realized under the voucher system, and n is the
number of vouchers “cashed.” The tax rate TV due to the voucher system is assumed
to be the same for profit and wage income. Non-participants get lower profits, since
the above expression applies, with n at zero. Infra-marginal participants get more,
since they average higher values for n.27
MORE COMPLEX VOUCHER SCHEMES
A Dynamic Voucher
One plausible reason for “discrimination” is employer’s erroneous estimation
of the productivity of black workers. If that causes the differential treatment of black
workers, the time path of an optimal voucher can be described by a simple dynamic
model. Assume discrimination is the reason for differential treatment, and it is due to
incorrect estimation of the individual productivity of blacks. After hiring, employers
accumulate information about the abilities of the individual hired, as well as fixed
investments in training.28 [If the voucher causes an increase in segregation, the op-
portunity for learning would be limited.] For both reasons, the optimal voucher amount
required to keep individuals employed, avoiding excessive and inefficient job turn-
over, would be less than the value required for initial hiring. A dynamic optimal
voucher would be declining for any individual working in a given firm. If highly suc-
cessful, the improvement in information regarding the actual productivities of blacks
could make the value of initial optimal vouchers decline over time.29
For a dynamic optimal voucher scheme, consider the following model: Define
KB(0) as an employer’s estimate of a black worker’s productivity before the worker is
hired, while KW(0) is the equivalent estimate for a white worker, and assume KW(0) >
KB(0). If actual productivities are equal the difference is due to employer error. As-347 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
sume the hiring process adds information about black and white workers and reduces
employer error.
Define  ′ =+ KKh
WW W () () , 00 where hW is result of the incremental information from
the hiring process for white workers. Define  ′ =+ KKh
BB B () () , 00 where hB is the re-
sult of incremental information from the hiring process for black workers. We assume
hB > hW, since employers are presumed to have less accurate information about black
workers. The optimal voucher before hiring would need to compensate for the pre-
hiring gap [KW(0) - KB(0)]. To maintain employment right after hiring, the voucher
would need to compensate for the gap [ ( ) ( )], ′ − ′ KK
WB 00 which is smaller than the ini-
tial gap by the difference [hW - hB].
After the discrete change resulting from the hiring process, assume there would
be a smooth change in the knowledge gap. Employers know their white workers bet-
ter than their black workers, but learn more about the black workers at each moment
of time. If DK is the time rate of change in knowledge, we assume
(18) DKB(t) = k[KW(t) - KB(t)],
where k>0 is a constant rate of adjustment parameter, and equation (18) is defined
only for values such that KW(t) - KB(t) > 0.
For simplicity, assume KW(t) is constant (= KW) after the hiring process. The re-
sults obtained below would still follow if KW(t) rose as the employer learned more
about the white worker, as long as correct knowledge about the black worker rose
faster. Over time, as [KW - KB(t)] approaches zero, the size of the optimal voucher
would be affected as well. Let the optimal voucher be determined by the knowledge
gap so that
(19) V*(t) = v[KW - KB(t)] + A
where v > 0 is another parameter rate of adjustment and A is the amount needed to
cover firm administrative costs. Combining equations (18) and (19) and differentiating
(given DKW=0):
(20) DV*(t) = - vk[KW - KB(t)].
As [KW - KB(t)] approaches zero (as it will, given equation (11)) the size of the optimal
voucher declines toward zero. If the optimal voucher covers firm administrative costs,
the voucher program would end with V* still a positive number, just covering those
costs (A).
How long this would take cannot be estimated without experimental data. How-
ever, some idea of the time required can be obtained by considering the learning
curve for workers. Employers, by observation, may reach as full a knowledge of their
employees’ abilities at around the same time that the employees, following a standard
learning curve, approach maximum productivity. The time period required varies by
industry and type of job, and an aggregate measure, even if available, would mean
little.348 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The learning curve provides an estimate of the time required for V* to approxi-
mate zero (net of administrative costs). The parameter v, measured at time zero
(prevoucher) can be set at unity—so V*(0) is the gap between the productivity esti-
mates. The slope of the learning curve provides an estimate of k, allowing the rate of
change in the optimal voucher to be calculated.
Non-homogeneous Vouchers
Even the dynamic analysis above assumes a single voucher for the whole economy.
Clearly this would not be the best system in any real application. In some labor mar-
kets there are wider divergences between black and white wages and employment
probabilities than in others. In some the divergence may not exist. A single voucher
value for all markets would be too high in markets with little current discrimination,
so high as to foster an inefficiently high demand for black workers. In other markets
with high current levels of discrimination the overall voucher would be too low for
efficiency. Clearly this is a limitation of a uniform voucher system. A true optimal
voucher system would require differential voucher values for different markets.
It is certainly reasonable to anticipate different voucher values for skilled and
unskilled labor. Since there are gender differences in the practice of discrimination,
there might be separate male and female vouchers (as shown in Section 4). The vouchers
may also be extended to other racial groups.30 Considering white males as the refer-
ence group, vouchers for workers of other race/gender groups can be estimated fol-
lowing the analysis developed in this study for blacks only. Discussion of all these
different types of voucher is beyond the scope of this study.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Current anti-discrimination programs resemble many other traditional govern-
mental interventions in social and market phenomena. They attempt to regulate be-
havior via rules and penalties, the effects they are intended to foster are not their only
effects, and those whose behavior they intend to control are motivated to subvert and
disobey them. They no doubt have significant positive effects on bridging racial and
gender income disparities. But they have never been fully successful in equalizing
incomes, unemployment rates, and job market opportunities. In the face of these
limitations of the traditional anti-discrimination programs, a voucher scheme, an in-
centive based method to fight job market discrimination, is proposed in this study to
supplement existing programs. The primary goal of the proposed voucher program is
to reduce the inefficiencies associated with the current programs, while improving
the results.
A number of advantages of the voucher system have been discussed along the
way, positive effects on employment and wages, lower enforcement and welfare costs,
improved efficiency, and gains for minority owned firms. An additional point with
respect to the last: there should be a rise in entrepreneurship for minorities with less
desire to discriminate and therefore a higher rate of return. This might mitigate the
current relatively low rate of such activity in the African-American population.349 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
An advantage not yet discussed is one common to market incentive programs in
general and vouchers in particular, i.e., transparency. In command type programs
costs are distributed in obscure ways, seldom explicitly discussed as part of the pro-
gram, and often difficult or impossible to measure. In voucher systems costs and the
distribution of costs and benefits are more explicit, more readily measured. In one
sense this is a disadvantage, costs that are visible are more easily attacked. On the
other hand, such costs are more easily controlled and may therefore be lower overall
(combined private and governmental) and they may also be more fairly distributed.
This type of voucher could also have certain disadvantages. We mentioned the
potential rise in work place segregation and the possible decline in white wages. An-
other disadvantage is the likelihood of an initial displacement of currently employed
white workers in favor of blacks. Since job loss is not costless this would put an unfair
burden on some white workers, which should be compensated for as part of the pro-
gram, as workers displaced by free trade agreements can be. It is important to note
that the proposed voucher is designed not to replace the existing programs, but to
supplement them when they fail to achieve their desired social goals. This program
should not therefore be applied universally to all situations, because such an approach
would add unnecessary costs to already existing costly programs.
A program as novel as the one suggested in this paper could hardly be imple-
mented without further studies, theoretical and otherwise. Obviously, an experimen-
tal program, along the general lines of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance experi-
ments would be useful, though small-scale experiments cannot be expected to faith-
fully mimic ones that would dramatically change the national labor market.
DATA APPENDIX
Definition of Variables Used in Different Equationsa
Variable Definition Equation in which it is used
Probit Wage Probit
(Stage 1) (Stage 2)
AGE Age in years y y y
AGESQ Age squared y y y
CENTCITY = 1, if lives in central city area y y y
SMSBLNS = 1, if lives in the balance of the MSA y y y
NEAST = 1, if lives in the North-Eastern region y y y
MWEST = 1, if lives in the Mid-West region y y y
WEST = 1, if lives in the West y y y
HSDGRE = 1, if he/she is a high school graduate y y y
ASSCDGRE = 1, if he/she has an associate degree y y y
BACHDGRE = 1, if he/she has a bachelors degree y y y
MSTRDGRE = 1, if he/she has a masters degree y y y
PROFDGRE = 1, if he/she has a professional degree y y y
DCTRDGRE = 1, if he/she has a doctorate degree y y y
MARRIED = 1, if married with spouse present y y y
USBORN = 1, if born in the United States y y y
FAMINC = Income of other family members (in thousands) y n y
FULLTIME = 1, if the worker works full time n y n
GOVEMP = 1, if the longest employment is in public sector y y n
MANG = 1, if the longest occupation is as a manager y y n
PROF = 1, if the longest occupation is as a professional y y n350 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
DATA APPENDIX—Continued
Definition of Variables Used in Different Equationsa
Variable Definition Equation in which it is used
Probit Wage Probit
(Stage 1) (Stage 2)
SERV = 1, if the longest occupation is in service y y n
SALE = 1, if the longest occupation is in sales y y n
ADMN = 1, if the longest occupation is in the y y n
administrative support field
OPRTV = 1, if the longest occupation as an operative y y n
MOVE = 1, if the longest occupation as a mover or laborer y y n
MANF = 1, if the longest industry is manufacturing y y n
TRAD = 1, if the longest industry is trading y y n
TRNS = 1, if the longest industry is transport y y n
INFO = 1, if the longest industry information tech. y y n
FINC = 1, if the longest industry is finance sector y y n
SRVC = 1, if the longest industry is the service sector y y n
PREDWAGE = predicted log wage rate n n y
a The “y” denotes “YES” and “n” represents “NO.”
NOTES
The authors wish to thank the seminar participants at California State University, Los Angeles,
three anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
Errors and omissions are our own.
1. Affirmative action covers only government employment (about 22 percent of employment, Eco-
nomic Report of the President, 1994), and jobs covered by contract compliance provisions. Its scope
was narrowed by two 1995 Supreme Court decisions.
2. One estimate for affirmative action is $1 billion per year, $50-80 per worker [Leonard, 1984; 1985].
For an analysis of existing programs that are most like vouchers, see Johnson and Welch [1976].
They assume a counter-factual strict quota, so their benefits and costs represent unrealistic
extremes. Welch [1981] discusses efficiency costs if real productivity differences cause wage and
employment differences. Arrow’s [1985] discrimination with no efficiency costs assumes rigid
conditions. Holzer and Neumark’s [1999, 67] survey states “there is, at this juncture, very little
compelling evidence of deleterious efficiency effects of Affirmative Action.” They conclude there is
evidence for efficiency gains, but not that gains outweigh enforcement costs.
3. We assume differences in hiring and pay, after allowing for measured differences in education,
experience and other observed characteristics, are due to discrimination so we will find the upper
bound of possible effects.
4. Mohanty [2002] shows the average labor force participation probability of black teenagers is far
smaller than that of Whites and Latinos.
5. Black Male income as a percent of White Male income rose from about 0.54 in 1964 to 0.60 in 1988
(1978 peak was 0.65) [U.S. Bureau of the Census], continuing a trend in evidence since at least
1940. Despite cyclical variations, post-1964 black relative unemployment rates have gone up
[Economic Report of the President, 1994]. See Smith and Welch [1977] on occupational conver-
gence. Brown [1984] ascribes half the wage convergence to supply side effects. Using employment
rates Baldwin and Johnson [1996] find large differences in employment opportunities. Freeman
[1973; 1981] finds changes in background (e.g., education) cause most of the improvement, but
perhaps indirectly as a result of anti-discrimination policies.
6. There are other explanations for changes in relative unemployment rates, including one most
consistent with this paper [Fairlie and Sundstrom, 1997, 254].
7. In Becker [1971] discrimination due to employer preferences disappears in the long run in com-
petitive markets, so use of employer preferences implies market failure. However, this study351 A VOUCHER SUPPLEMENT
argues that if higher black unemployment rates are due to employers’ preferences, this can be
corrected more efficiently by supplementing existing programs with vouchers. The effects of
vouchers on discrimination from other causes should be the subject of further research.
8. A principal objection to voucher programs in labor markets is the “stigma effect” [Burtless 1985] –
eligibility marks you as less productive so employers are unwilling to hire and workers are unwill-
ing to use the voucher. This effect is less important for this plan than for those in prior literature,
aside from Bartik’s [2001] criticism of Burtless. Most getting a voucher are already stigmatized—
a voucher will not increase the stigma.
9. Assuming employers have identical preferences with respect to discrimination. Dropping this
assumption implies different employers hire different racial proportions of workers at a given
wage differential. Employers with the least taste for discrimination hire only blacks. Those with
the most desire hire only whites.
10. To obtain equality of PW and PB, V* must cover firms’ costs of administering the program. For a
discussion of the importance of administrative costs, see Ellwood [1988].
11. Presumably firms owned/managed by blacks have the greatest reduction in labor costs so the
voucher program could substitute for “set aside” programs. Net benefits for firms with little or no
desire to discriminate imply “windfall effects,” payments for doing things that would be done
anyway, raising the cost of the program. Bartik [2001] considers marginal approaches that restrict
payment to firms based on hiring they would do without the plan. This raises administrative costs
[Bartik, 2001, 205] and may cause “strange incentives” for employers. The total amount paid in
vouchers is not a true measure of the cost of the program, so we have rejected the more complex
marginal approach.
12. True segregation is plausible only in the long run, since few firms would find it desirable to replace
many workers right away [Arrow, 1972].
13. Current programs may benefit educated, wealthy, blacks. With heterogeneous vouchers, if V* for
black neurosurgeons is zero (no discrimination in the market) no vouchers are issued, even if
there are few such neurosurgeons due to discrimination in education or credit markets.
14. A black worker may have several employers so issues, such as “how many vouchers this worker
qualifies for” and “which employer receives how much,” must be resolved for implementation. We
thank a reviewer for raising this important issue. The simplest solution is “one person, one
voucher,” the recipient choosing which employer to give it to.
15. See Speigelman and Woodbury [1990]. For an evaluation of the Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, and Washington experiments see Mayer [1995]. Dubin and Rivers [1993, 233] find utilization
and effectiveness are positively related to the size of the voucher, relative to a productivity gap,
and to the percentage of the work force eligible for vouchers.
16. We thank a referee for raising this issue that helped us to clarify the distinctive features of this
study compared to earlier ones.
17. Targeting the unemployed encourages firms to fire current employees and hire new ones with
vouchers, it encourages employees to quit and qualify for a voucher. Targeting all black workers
would improve the retention rate of the employed, increase the employment probability of the
unemployed, and raise aggregate black employment.
18. Our unreported results indicate that inclusion of other identifying variables improves the signifi-
cance levels of the parameter estimates considerably.
19. We thank a reviewer for raising this interesting issue.
20. Note that the annual CPS demographic file provides the actual data for the previous year, and
consequently our 2000 sample, in fact, represents the 1999 statistics.
21. Our 2003 sample, in fact, contains 2002 data. (See footnote 20). To compute the magnitude of the
annual voucher, we obtained from the Economic Report of the President [February, 2004] the
average weekly hours of employment [Table B-47, 340] and the number of unemployed black
workers in the labor force [Table B-38, 330]. The annual vouchers (AV) were then obtained
separately for men and women by using the following formula:
AV = (Hourly Voucher) × (Weekly Hours) × (52 Weeks) ×
(Number of Unemployed Blacks in the Labor Force).352 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
For men, AV = ($.92)×(33.9)×(52)×(835,000) = $1,354,182,960, and for women, it is ($1.35)
×(33.9)×(52)×(858,000) = $2,041,851,240. Thus the total estimated voucher outlay for the year
2002 is $3,396,034,200.
22. The GDP for the year 2002 was $10,480.8 billions [Economic Report of the President, 2004, Table
B-1, 284), and the total federal outlay in that year was $2,010,970 millions [ERP, 2004, Table B-81,
380). The total voucher outlay estimated in footnote 21 thus represents .03 percent of the GDP and
.17 percent of the total federal outlay.
23. The 2002 total annual spending on Unemployment Insurance, a social program complementary to
our proposed voucher was $42,798 millions [Economic Report of the President, 2004, Table B-45,
337]. The 2002 federal spending on other complementary social programs (in millions) are as
follows: “Education, training, employment and social services” = $70,544, “Veteran benefits and
services” = $50,984, “Administration of justice” = $35,171, “Health” = $196,544 and “Medicare” =
$230,855 [Economic Report of the President, 2004, Table B-81, 380]. The maximum cost of the
proposed voucher as shown in footnote 21, on the other hand, is only $3,396 millions, and so it is
financially viable.
24. Although all employers in a given market receive vouchers by employing blacks, those who hire
more receive more vouchers. Employers operating in a more discriminatory market are expected,
ceteris paribus, to receive more vouchers than those in a less discriminatory one. This does not
mean highly discriminating employers receive more vouchers than less discriminating ones. In a
given market with a given level of discrimination, an employer who discriminates more receives
less in voucher funds. We thank a referee for making this clarification possible.
25. They may gain — they do not hire people they hate, or go to court. Note we assume a voucher is
not marketable, that alternative has interesting efficiency and distribution effects, but they are off
the main line of this paper.
26. For simplicity a flat tax (single rate) is used for the calculation.
27. Employers’ first order conditions for utility maximization require the marginal disutility of hiring
the next black to equal the marginal loss in utility from profit foregone due to not hiring the next
black. If there is no desire to discriminate, the result is the profit maximizing solution. If there is a
marginal desire to discriminate, employers with different preferences discriminate to different
degrees. The voucher changes the optimal number of blacks for some employers, for some the
utility maximizing value can be zero.
28. With respect to the dynamic declining voucher model, Bartik [2001, 241] notes considerable
persistence of higher earnings after wage subsidies are eliminated, i.e., employers realized those
hired were productive enough to keep even when firms pay the full costs. This supports the
supposition of the dynamic model that voucher levels fall over time as learning occurs. If discrimi-
nation is not due to employer ignorance the result might still apply, workers and/or customers
might become used to integration.
29. If there is a desire to discriminate, not underestimation of black productivity, this model does not
apply. Instead, the required number of vouchers declines as the share of employment controlled
by bigots approaches zero. The voucher increases the advantage of not discriminating, reduces the
time needed to eliminate discrimination and the amount of discrimination during the process. If
the bias arises from other employees, the voucher compensates for costs from that source.
30. The racial and ethnic classification in the 2000 census means identification of workers into differ-
ent racial groups may cause estimation problems. This issue, however, cannot be solved in a single
article and is recognized as a limitation of this study. Proper precautions should therefore be taken
while collecting data to estimate the actual voucher. We thank a reviewer for bringing this
empirical problem to our notice.
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